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Memory, War, and Emotion; 
disclosure interviews Jay Winter. 
January 27, 2006 
Dr. Jay Winter is the Charles J. Stille Professor of 
History at Yale University. He was a university lecturer 
and reader at Cambridge University until 2001 , when 
he returned to the United States. Specializing in 
World War I, Dr. Winter has authored a number of 
books on the social impacts of war, most recently 
on memory and commemoration. His current book, 
Sites of Memory, Sites of Mourning: The Great War 
in European Cultural History, explores the ways in 
which emotion and meaning are mediated by the 
material sites of war memorials. As a guest of the 
annual Committee on Social Theory's Public Lecture 
Series, Dr. Winter spoke about 11Anger and Memory: 
The Moral Witness and Two World Wars" January 27, 
2006. disClosure editors Brandon Absher and George 
Phillips had the opportunity to meet with Dr. Winter 
during his visit to the University of Kentucky. 
dC: As you know the theme of this year's issue 
of disClosure is emotion. Do you think that emotion is 
overlooked in the humanities in general? Would you 
say that it is underrepresented as a theme of inquiry? 
JW: Yes it is. Part of the attraction of emotion is 
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that it is part of this "memory boom" that's going on throughout the humanities -
social sciences too, for that matter. Everybody's interested in memory. That's true 
in literature, in history, anthropology, sociology, and politics - it's true of the entire 
academy. And not only the academy- it's true in fiction, in theater, and film . There 
are all kinds of ways in which the signature of our current generation is memory 
rather than class, race, or gender. Memory is big business - it sells. And like 
many complex phenomena, it works primarily through affect. You retain a memory 
because of the charge of emotion that was attached to it. So the expression of the 
fascination with emotion is because this "memory boom" gets its institutional form 
in this conceptual movement. 
How we know about emotion has multiple possibilities: one of them is 
cognitive psychology and another is philosophy. A third is the field of force that 
exists between history and memory - oral history, interviews, ethnic histories, the 
recreation of the past of immigrants and survivors of catastrophes like 9/11, etc. 
The "memory boom" is the configuration of memories that we share about who we 
are and where we come from. So my understanding of emotion is that it is under-
theorized, under-analyzed, and little understood because it is cloaked by this vast 
and expanding category of memory. What we need to do is get under this category 
and find out what people really mean by the word "memory" to understand how 
emotion and affect are dominant within the humanities and social sciences too. 
dC: Would you say that the "memory boom" is happening in part because of 
all the atrocities of the Twentieth Century? 
JW: Yes. That's right. It's over-determined. The "memory boom" is happening 
for many reasons. One of them is the need for recognition and acknowledgement 
of the victims of war in the Twentieth Century. This is true of women, children, and 
the elderly as much as it is of soldiers. The category of "victim" which used to be 
related to men in uniform - think of shell shock or post-traumatic stress disorder 
- has expanded throughout society. There are other sources as well. One of 
them is that those who can tell their story can claim compensation from the state 
for injuries. So there's a material dimension to this that led the American Medical 
Association in 1980 to accept the category of post-traumatic stress disorder as a 
medical syndrome which therefore produced medical pensions - pensions on the 
basis of medical disability. The emotion that is attached to shell shock is terror and 
paralytic fear. So when we look at the question of war and its victims we can see 
how material issues can be involved in the way in which we as citizens feel - and 
maybe are wise to feel - responsibility for those who have vanished in war. 
Between 1960 and 1990 there's also a gigantic increase - of a factor of 
at lest three or four - of the number of people who go on to higher education in 
both the United States and in Europe. By that I mean that the demand curve for 
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cultural products has shifted to the right. There are a lot more people interested 
in historical museums than ever before. There are a lot more people who are 
educated - highly educated - than ever before and what they spend their 
disposable income on cultural products - for example, on the History Channel, 
on visiting battle fields, on traveling over-seas to exotic or non-exotic places - has 
increased. There is a material source for the outcome of the "memory boom." 
For exhibitions, there's now a whole art exhibition specialty called a "blockbuster 
exhibition," and this never happened before. So you have both a moral and 
political issue, a material issue, and, I would argue, a shift in the demand for 
artifacts describing the past and our relationship to it. There are probably a host 
of other reasons I could add, but the important thing is that it's over-determined. 
There are so many explanations for it. 
And, the likelihood, I think, is pretty clear that emotion will be encapsulated 
by memory for the foreseeable future. That's on the basis of thirty years of living 
in Europe. I've only been back here for five years now. But spending most of my 
professional life in Cambridge, England has led me to see both that I'm American 
by accent and upbringing and that it's really on both sides of the ocean. I don't 
think there's much difference. 
dC: Since we're talking about victimization and you alluded to the 
emotional consequences of war, could you say something about these emotional 
consequences? Your work Sites of Memory, Sites of Mourning talks a lot about 
this issue. How do people deal with these emotions and how do they express 
them? 
JW: Well, there are two levels to deal with. One is that wars don't stop at the 
armistice. The idea that you can have a beginning date and a terminal date for 
war is old-fashioned. The character of violence, both international and domestic, 
as such is to make legal definitions of warfare redundant and out of date. So, 
the post-war moment frequently involves violence and involves displacement, 
dispossession, and the inability to go home again in the full sense of the term. 
The earthquakes that wars represent have after-shocks that are just as integral to 
the story of war as the battles themselves. Those involve women, children, and 
the elderly as much as soldiers. So, it's everybody's story. 
Sites of Memory, Sites of Mourning was an attempt to contribute to an 
already existing literature, the center-piece of which is a great work called The 
Great War and Modern Memory by Paul Fussell.1 Fussell was a soldier in the 
Second World War who survived by accident because he was looked after by a 
professional soldier, who was a sergeant. During the Battle of the Bulge they both 
hit the ground, a shell over head, and the sergeant didn't stand up. The book is 
dedicated to him. So the accidental and arbitrary nature of warfare is part of what 
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Fussell calls the "ironic moment" or in another phrase "modern memory." By that 
he means the sense that history is a game in which we are trapped, at the moment 
when someone has torn up the rules. The idea that there is, as it were, anticipation 
leading to outcome has to be rethought - they're always at a vast distance from 
each other. The notion that we actually can control the development of our own 
lives and that we die one at a time - all these, shall we say, predictive elements 
of life, according to Fussell, came to an end in 1914. Now why did he write that? 
Because he was a soldier in the Second World War and knew something about the 
arbitrary nature of survival. But also because he was fed up during the Vietnam 
War with people talking about body counts when they had no idea about what they 
were getting into at all. So, it's a post-Vietnam book. 
My take on this is slightly different. He created something called "modern 
memory" in his work saying that the First World War was the moment when 
Twentieth Century cultural life and literary life, in particular, began. And those 
writers - Norman Mailer, Thomas Pynchon - who wrote thereafter are standing on 
the shoulders of giants. This ironic vision of the world - that we're not in control 
of what we think we are and that, in many respects, we are less free to know the 
fate that awaits us than somebody in the 18th Century - led to the view of modern 
memory. My book was an attempt to say the opposite. Namely, that what war 
does is create gigantic cultural ripples, but in a backward as well as a forward 
direction. It doesn't just create modern memory; it creates un-modern memory 
at the same time. And by that I mean a reiteration or a flowering of classical 
romantic and religious images. For instance, the superstition of spirit photography 
- a move of the sacred out of the churches into the practices we now think are 
exotic, esoteric, possibly slightly insane. 
But millions of people needed help to cope with this dislocated world in 
1918 or in 1949. And they got it wherever they found it, whether in churches or 
not, it didn1t matter. My claim is that Fussell wrote a masterpiece, but war turns 
the cultural clock backward. Not necessarily by creating wonderfully imaginative, 
original, abstract works which I understand to be Modernism, but by moving 
the clock back to a moment when the romantic is powerful and classical norms 
- associated with the Trojan war - flourish and a certain kind of religious sensibility 
on the pagan parameters of Christianity really connects to us all. 
dC: In your work you talk about the sites of memorial as civil religion. Yet, you 
also believe that it's not being used for patriotic purposes. Could you talk about 
the idea of civil religion and how this isn't connected to patriotism? 
JW: Yes. The notion is that, especially in France, when people visit war 
memorials, {this is Antoine Prost's notion and I subscribe to it completely) they're 
not there to worship the state, they·re not there to worship the profession of arms.2 
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They're there to mourn those who fe ll and they are fundamentally pacifist. War 
memorials, in their original form, are fundamentally about loss, memory, and 
"never again." But, over time war memorials - and I say this in Sites of Memory 
- are plastic; they're malleable, they have a half-l ife, and they begin to lose their 
original charge as soon as they are unveiled. And o~her meanings, different 
meanings, sometimes contradictory meanings can be attached to them. 
But the initial purpose of this vast commemorative moment was to make 
war unthinkable. "Never again" is a phrase of the First World War not the Second. 
It's not about the Holocaust; it's about the First World War. And, the extraordinary 
difference between countries has to be recognized. The Nazis obviously did 
something different. But, in the inter-war years there's an awful lot of soldier's 
pacifism. It sounds like a contradiction in terms, an oxymoron; it isn't. Soldier's 
pacifism was a reality. And, these sites made sacred the sacrifices of people not 
for the purpose of glorifying war or glorifying the nation, but for the purpose of living 
out the republican ideas they were educated into from the 18701s on when France 
became a republic.again. 
What Prost has done is quite extraord inary; he's one of the great 
historians practicing today. He first of all counts the monuments - 33,000 or 
38,000 or something like that, huge numbers, in every little village. He sees what 
they are and he describes them all; very social scientific. And then, he shifts gears 
into a kind of lyrical romanticism to describe what they look like and what it felt like 
to be there. So, when I was originally approached to think about emotion, here·s 
the place to find it. Think of memory as being built into material objects. Material 
objects have narratives to them; it's for us to tease them out. And when you do, 
you get the emotional charge. So, emotion never exists outside the language 
in which it is expressed or the objects to which it gives expression. That's what 
some people call the linguistic turn . But, I think it's true that if you look at objects 
of commemorative form or objects of art, the emotional charge is in it. It's up to 
us to pull it out. 
Think of Mia Lynn's Vietnam Veteran1s Memorial - here1s a huge charge. 
It's in the object. The important thing is that it comes out in our relationship to 
that object when we interrogate ourselves. "What are we doing here by looking at 
this?" And she made the surface colorless to enable us to look at our own faces, 
to literally say that. That's in my view one of the things the focus on emotion can 
enable us to do - to find those sites where your own engagement with the subject is 
made manifest. And when that happens, when the charge of the object, your own 
emotive contribution, creates something new, something different, some people 
call it an anti-monument. In other words, it's about the relationship between the 
object and you and not about some message which is didactic and hortatory. It's 
about us; not so much about them. It's about the living and not about the dead. 
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dC: You mentioned museums earlier. Does it take away some of that 
emotional charge when you have an object removed from its site and put in 
artificial places like museums? 
JW: It can. You're right, there is a problem there. One thing though that 
makes a difference is that these sites - museum sites - where objects are 
artificially located are sites where 11universal history11 and "family history" cross. 
People come to exhibitions and bring their family histories with them. So what 
they do with the objects is use them as triggers to either contextualize or actualize 
stories about their Great-Uncle Harry or Aunt Bess or whoever. 
By making it possible for people who are not in the academy to participate 
in the narrative of the past, we now face a historical public which is much more 
voracious in its consumption of historical books and publications than ever before. 
Most of which are not written by professionals. They're written by all kinds of 
people. What's wrong with that? This is the field of public history. This is a very 
powerful and, I think, interesting field. The internet is all over it. So is the History 
Channel. So are all kinds of digitized materials. 
I did a series on the history of the First World War for PBS and BBC 
nine years ago and that wouldn't have been possible to do in the 1950's. When 
television was born it wasn't there for that purpose. It took time for there to be 
a technical revolution that enabled history to encapsulate emotion. And in many 
respects, there are two critical breakthroughs necessary for this. The fi rst was the 
invention of the audiovisual cassette in the 60's where you could record voices 
which are emotive. The second one is Ken Burns' series on the U.S Civil War. 
Ken did it through banjo music. He used music to give it a motif and to give the 
loser~ the Southerner - the narrative voice, there's music there. So, you record 
the v~1ce and then you record the music. And, when you do both of those things 
t~chnic~lly, yo~ can create an affective feel surrounding history which sells it and 
disseminates 1t to tens of millions of people. That's at the core of the memory 
boo~ . And i.t does do things that are important. There are, of course, lousy 
versions of this. Not everybody is a Ken Burns. 
. A good deal of the time the subject of war is now taught in different ways 
than it has .been befor~. It's no longer primarily about weaponry or shock-troops 
on the cutt1~g edge. Its about a test of society, a test of large groups of people 
from very d1ff~rent walk~ of life. And, it's also about individuals who are trapped 
?r caught up in something that they never anticipated or didn't foresee. So, for 
instance, the idea that war is about generals is gone. Who's the commander in Iraq 
n?w? I ~on't kno~ who it is. It doesn't matter anymore. It's not Westmoreland. 
Its not Vietnam. Its another world where war is diffused and has all kinds of faces 
attached to it and, as we now know, it doesn't come to an end. 
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dC: If you think about war as more diffuse and as about individuals, and if 
you think the most salient and lasting feature of it is mourning, why is it that states 
continue to go to war with one another? 
JW: The problem is that it's not states that go to war anymore. It is 
transnational groups and sub-national groups who attack in such a way as to 
make states react. The nation state is sti ll there, but its borders are porous. Al-
Qaeda is not a national organization. Colombia hasn't been a state for fifty years. 
It has four or five different armies all jockeying for position. Yugoslavia fell apart. 
The notion that war is that institution which defines a state is going out of date. 
Globalization makes it difficult. Ecological problems, climate change, etc. these 
are transnational issues. In Europe - where I've been for the last year and where 
I taught for most of my life - there is something now which is supra-national. The 
law of the European Union is superior to the law of the individual states in the 
same way as the Supreme Court is superior to state law. That was a fundamental 
step on the way to the unification of the United States. I'm not sure it's going to 
happen in Europe, but it's there. And every country that joins the European Union 
has to accept that supremacy in the judicial construction of the Europe. So, the 
state isn't what it used to be. It's sti ll there, but wars happen between and among 
groups some of which are states and a lot of which are not. So, war is now 
fragmented into smaller units and smaller and sometimes bigger forms that don't 
describe national boundaries. There's something else. 
dC: Those groups that are waging war with states - like 9/11, which are 
intended as acts of war- are doing these things because they fail to appreciate the 
mourning that goes along with war and these acts of violence? 
JW: I don't know if scholars later will find this especially. But, in my view 
9/11 was an expansion of the civil war within Islam that was going on for 30 years 
before. What happened was that three major states kept up Western interests in 
the Islamic world : Nigeria, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia. The war within Islam is to say 
that such a westernization of the societies and religious beliefs that goes along 
with American development is destroying Islam. And it's one minute to midnight. 
So what they needed to do is to cut off the hand that supports these profane 
Islamic states. And the way to do that is to get the United States to pull out. So, 
the attack on the World Trade Centers was an attempt, if anything, to provoke the 
United States to go in to the Arab world and, therefore, to horrify Muslims even 
further - to show them the reality of the base character of the regimes under which 
they live. You want to overthrow Saudi Arabia, you get the United States to come 
in and show what Saudi Arabia really is - the McDonald's of the West. 
When the time comes, the notion of losses - both to the people who 
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have been murdered and to themselves - is relatively unimportant because the 
civil war has been going on for twenty years without anybody noticing it at all . The 
numbers who have been tortured and killed are much greater than the numbers 
who died in 9/11 or even in the War in Iraq. But, all that is irrelevant once a state 
is attacked and the state configures it as a war between states and actually finds 
one to destroy in order to be conventional. Saddam Hussein was overthrown, I 
think, because an Arab state had to be overthrown and Afghanistan wasn't good 
enough - it was too thin of a state. It wasn't because of weapons. Whether they 
lied about it or not, we know they weren't there. You can make you own judgment 
about when that was - whether before they decided to go or after. The critical 
point, in my view, is that the context of war is transnational. 
The attack on the United States on 9/11 was an attack on the civil war 
support that the United States has given to these three major oil controlling or 
producing nations - especially Saudi Arabia and Nigeria who are big oil producers 
- in order to stop them from becoming fully fundamentalist. We can argue that 
they were wrong or right, but their immorality seems clear. Their cruelty to the 
women and men on those planes is evident in the World Trade Center attacks. 
The stupefying brutality of what they did is unquestionable. But the framework 
is of a war of a kind that we haven't seen much of before. It doesn't look like the 
war that American leaders of both parties want to talk about because we want to 
talk about one state versus another. That's the way we conceptualize war and 
it's not like that anymore. Adjusting to it is another matter. All the leaders go to 
Condaleeza Rice and she was a Soviet expert. The Cold War was a war between 
two big people with satellites and surrogates. Things aren't like that anymore. It's 
no surprise that they couldn't handle the intelligence information, since they tried 
to fit it into boxes that weren't relevant to it anymore. 
dC: Since we're speaking about 9/11 and issues surrounding that, what's 
your opinion about the World Trade Center memorial site? The architects say in 
their opening statement, "This design proposes a space that resonates with the 
feelings of loss and absence that were generated by the death and destruction at 
the World Trade Center." Also, Mayor Bloomberg said something that was very 
interesting. He believes that the site is actually for our children. He claims, "It is 
so that those ~ho visit that sacred ground know what happened there and why so 
many people died to protect our freedoms." What are your thoughts about this and 
how we feel about it? Also, what do you think of Mayor Bloomberg's invocation of 
the sacred here? 
JW: That's not his invention; it's Rudy Giuliani. They took two steel girders 
and left them like a cross in the pit that was dug in all the rubble. Outside there 
was a sign saying 'This is to honor all the heroes· who died in 9/11 ." Who decided 
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that they were all heroes? A cleaning person accidentally sweeping the staircase 
when the plane blew up - what's heroic about that? So the notion of sacrifice 
and heroism is what gives the public officials the language of the sacred. I find it 
repellant. It seems to me to use the concept of the sacred for political advantage 
is questionable at best and hypocritical at worst. So, the deployment of these 
symbols makes the notion of holy war easier for Americans to accept. 
"Jihad" in Islam is a direct copy of crusader language. "Jihad" comes out 
of the crusades and not the other way around. To see what is happening now as a 
crusade is monstrous. First of all, it would never end. Secondly, it would mean a 
war between the West and Islam which is not a war that the West is going to win. 
There are too many people out there - there are more than a billion Muslims. You 
can't wage a war of that kind. And yet, it seems necessary to make the political 
space for the decisions that have been taken by those in power. Democrats 
have been just as fast to use this language as Republicans. So this is not Bush-
bashing. 
The second thing is that, for what it's worth, both here and in Berlin my 
advice was sought about what to do because of what I've done in France on war 
memorials. The Berlin memorial was of the Holocaust and I was approached by 
the German government and the same thing happened in the city of New York. 
Here it wasn't the federal government, it was municipal. In both cases, my advice 
was to leave the site empty. The less said, the more it means. If you want to show 
what happened there to your children or grandchildren, leave it empty. I don't 
know if you've been down there, but it's so eery. Every time I went I would look 
up to see where the Towers went. It's almost like a reflex in the back of my head. 
What you see is this big space and then you see nothing. So, in my mind's eye I 
think I'd somehow become figured toward the buildings and they weren't there. It 
was absolutely eery to see the space of nothing. That is one of the most difficult 
and complex emotions you can imagine. You can feel something, but to feel 
nothing - that's hard. They did it. They had the space. But this is the most high-
priced real estate in the Manhattan, maybe even the world. The German decision 
was taken for other reasons but it was also right smack in the middle of the official 
city next to the Brandenburg Gate. 
If the issue is what kind of memorial would you build to remind people 
in fifty years of what happened here, I don't think architecture is very good at it. 
Minimalism of the kind Mia Lynn did with the Vietnam Veteran's Memorial is much 
greater than bombastic stuff where the sacred comes out. But, politicians can't 
live with minimalism; they don't get the headlines, nobody listens. So, they're 
compromised time and time again. In turn what might be a major achievement like 
Mia Lynn's most of the time doesn't get built because it's about something rather 
than about nothing. War is about both-it's about something and it's about nothing. 
It's about the nothingness that accompanies lost life but it's also about the series of 
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decisions that were taken - maybe on the basis of inadequate knowledge, maybe 
on the basis of real knowledge -that change the world in which we live. So, going 
back to the Michael Bloomberg statement, I don't think he'll ever get what he 
asked for. He'll never get a monument that will tell the children fifty years from now 
what happened here - not with the political pressures under which all politicians 
work. However, if he had left it empty - the one part of Manhattan that has nothing 
in it, quite simply nothing - this would be weird , eery, and uncanny. This is exactly 
what the attack of 9/11 was. It was a gash on the earth like Mia Lynn's memorial 
that is irresistible; it attracts you to see "What in the world is this." "This is going 
into the ground" - six or eight floors when the towers crashed. It can't be done. It 
has to be done in some super-duper multi-story setting where the acts of verticality 
- and maybe New York had to do this - suggest hope. That's why you can't leave 
it empty, you have to give hope. And, hope architecturally is always pointed up. 
dC: This is reminiscent of your discussion of Verdun in Sites of Memory, Sites 
of Mourning. Would you draw any connections here? It seems as though what 
you're suggesting is similar to what was done there. There's this open space and 
just a scar on the face of the earth. 
JW: Well the forests have grown back but they haven't rebuilt the towns. 
Some of the towns are completely gone but the forts are just the way they were. 
Sometimes nature just takes over. Maybe that would happen in New York. The 
claim of minimal signification is frequently a claim for maximal effect because the 
more you can identify the symbols of a commemorative form the less free you 
are to bring your own emotion to it. So, if you go to something like the Lincoln 
Memorial, for example, its figurative character already tells you, "Here's a wise 
man sitting down looking over his people." It's over-sized, laying down the law, the 
man who set his people free. All of those things are there. What black Americans 
think about it or white Americans I don't know, but the story is there for you - it's 
already there. Saying less is frequently saying more. 
When nature takes over a site there is an act of imagination to put your 
self back in this place where not a single tree existed. Everything, absolutely 
everything, was destroyed in this twelve month battle of bombardment - probably 
two million shells were used. I think there are many examples of this, where if 
you create a memorial, you frequently tell the story in a hortatory or didactic way. 
This is one reason why I think Gettysburg is good as a field - it's very hard to find 
where the Gettysburg Address happened. Nobody heard it at the time. It was just 
"over there" somewhere. Whereas if you want a very big, grandiose monument, 
you'll be told what to feel and what to think. That's what's going to happen with 
the World Trade Center. I think the pressures are too great to let it alone. The 
symbols will be very mixed and probably very difficult for our grandchildren to 
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figure out. Let's hope they do a better job than we do. 
dC: War isn't just about grief. There are people who are angry and people 
who are filled with hate. There's the joy of victory. There are all kinds of things 
that happen. You talk a lot about the cultural and material consequences of grief 
and mourning. Do you think there are similar consequences to these emotions? 
Would there be sites of anger, fear, or joy like there are sites of mourning? Are 
there places we can go to feel these things? 
JW: Well the choices seem to me to be limited. First, there's the battlefield 
itself. Like the World Trade Center, the battlefields can be retaken by nature and 
sometimes by construction. So, if you imagine the Warsaw Ghetto as a place 
where dreadful things happened, it's now a housing district of relatively pleasant 
high rises. So where do you go there? There is a structure there, but where do 
you go to see it? It isn't very easy to find. Battlefields are all over Europe and they 
aren't easy to find . I still believe that small is beautiful, the miniature is the key to 
these gigantic stories. The smaller they are the better. 
There's one, for instance, on Rosenstrasse in Berlin which is very small 
- it's a little park. It tells the story of three hundred German women in 1943 in 
Berlin whose husbands were partially Jewish. The husbands were taken out to 
be deported. These three hundred women - God knows with what courage - sat 
in front of Gestapo headquarters on Rosenstrasse. They had a sit-down strike 
to demand their men back. And I almost didn't believe it when I first read it, but 
they got them back. Yes the Gestapo put machine guns in front of them. Yes 
they could have murdered them all. But they didn't. Instead the men came back. 
One of the children of one of the couples, the woman of whom was in the sit-down 
strike husband of whom was in the prison, did the sculpture that is in the street 
telling the story of his mother's courage and that of her three hundred friends to 
get their men back. Now, that story is tiny. It's very small compared to the Second 
World War. God knows it is infinitesimally smaller than Band of Brothers or Saving 
Private Ryan. But, that is a space which has anger, courage, hope, and a lot of 
other things and it has loss too. This is the only place where this happened. All 
the other streets of Berlin have nothing of the kind. I suppose my sense is that 
the way in which emotion can be expressed is outside the gates of the political to 
start with and, secondly, it must focus on very small groups. The bigger we get in 
the field of the representation of emotion the more likely we will loose the affective 
charge at the core of a story. Small is beautiful in this regard. 
dC: The last thing I wanted to ask you is whether you think these sites let us 
go through cathartic experience. Do we let go of our emotions when we visit these 
places? Or do they let us have our grief or anger? 
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JW: I think monuments mediate grief. They don't necessarily let us loose it. 
I've seen hundreds of people at different war memorials - including Mia Lynn's 
Vietnam Veteran's Memorial and all over Europe - who touch the names on the 
war memorial. The reason they do that is that they get a reality check. They know 
what they lost, but they know also what they haven't lost. They can go on living. 
The purpose of the visit is not so much to forget about the dead, but to recognize 
that there is life that carries on anyway and not to feel that this is a crime - that ii 
is an insult or some kind of profanity to acknowledge loss and to grieve for it and 
go back to your life. This is, by the way, deeply ingrained in Jewish culture. After 
a year you have to get up and if you stay in your mourning after a year, you're 
committing a sin. Paralysis is not necessary. It's not living, it's shadow living. 
Many of these sites of commemorative form are places that mediate grief so thal 
people can get up and live their lives again. 
Notes 
(Endnotes) 
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